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Law and its Discontents
Since the inception of the welfare state in mid-19th century France and England, 
claims for equity, empowerment and entitlement have been couched in terms of 
law. These claims -  for positive public policies translated into legally enforceable 
rights, for the creation of participatory processes of governance, for access to 
material and human resources, for dignity and empowerment — are understood to 
be an expression of the desire for personal and collective advancement 
characteristic of democratic societies.
Such claims frequently conflict with claims to be immune from state control 
or regulation through law, claims to have human affairs disposed of by the working 
of “spontaneous,” non-governmental ordering mechanisms such as the 
marketplace, customary practices, or even religious authority. Freedom from state 
control, and latterly, from the burden of legal entitlements generated by it, is often 
characterized as the very essence of democracy. The notion of the Rule of Law 
was, for a century or more, understood to be a prescription for a form of 
democracy in which the state would be legally compelled to abstain from many of 
the most effective modes of regulatory action.
These contesting views are today coupled with another idea. Far from being 
seen either as a positive force of empowerment or as a bulwark against unwanted 
state action, the very notion of law — the vehicle by which such state action is most 
typically undertaken -  is itself contested. For many, the perceived failure of the 
modern regulatory state amounts to a perceived failure of law itself.
Because law is everywhere in issue, there are extraordinary opportunities for 
socio-legal research. The general sense that law has failed is neither minor and 
confined to a few intractable arenas of human interaction, nor is it due to easily 
corrected errors of technique or procedure. State law often fails substantively; 
many governmental initiatives are unsuccessful and sometimes produce perverse 
consequences exacerbating the problems being addressed. State law also often 
fails procedurally; even when it succeeds in reaching appropriate substantive 
results, its mechanisms and processes are sometimes so cumbersome and alien 
that the desired legal solution remains inaccessible for those who are its purported
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beneficiaries. Finally, state law often fails symbolically, far from enhancing respect 
for the fundamental ideals of law and justice, legal activity may result in such 
ideals being contested or trivialized by polemical debate. Thus, not only have the 
great projects of social redistribution run up against the hard wall of budgetary 
constraint, they have generated inefficiencies, inequalities and unfairness. The 
clamour in certain circles for privatization, deregulation and smaller government 
is one reflection of this perception of failure.
Yet the widespread continuing faith in law and increased recourse to law is 
equally present. The fate of aboriginal peoples, on one account, is perceived to 
turn on their securing the constitutionally protected right to legislate for 
themselves, as a third order of government. Statutory enactment of an 
“Environmental Bill of Rights” is proposed as a strategy for better protecting the 
physical environment. Consumers, shareholders, tenants and minority language 
speakers seek legal protection, as do those disadvantaged by reason of their 
gender, race or class.
No programme of socio-legal scholarship can immediately resolve or reconcile 
these divergent views. However, it can bring into focus what has largely gone 
unnoticed: the co-existence of several spontaneous and structured state, para-state 
and non-state regimes of law. A better understanding of these diverse legal 
regimes is central to analyzing the successes and failures of attempts to use law to 
advance democratic values.
To date, most socio-legal scholarship has revealed a deep ambivalence about 
these competing perspectives. One line of research has focused on the tacit 
contextual influences that generate normativity, and the processes by which other 
normative regimes may reinforce, defeat or transform the implementation of state- 
centred legal strategies. This line of research is relatively agnostic about the 
power and virtue of state law and accepts the inevitability and legitimacy of other 
kinds of legal regimes.
An opposing tendency, focused on such instruments as the Charter,1 has 
reiterated and reinforced belief in the capacities of state law. Such stipulative 
scholarship may be driven by the widely observed alienation of citizens from 
government, the force of populist demands for greater emphasis on process and 
participation, or growing discontent with the rising costs and declining satisfactions 
of the welfare state. Great emphasis is placed upon identifying and declaring legal 
rights and remedies, so as to ensure that the state and its institutions respond not 
just to bureaucratic and political imperatives, but also to the interests and advocacy 
of citizens, individually and collectively.
1Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of 
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The Agenda of Critical Legal Pluralism
While neither total faith in nor total scepticism about state law is warranted, what 
seems odd is how seldom either is based on an understanding of what law is, what 
law does, how it succeeds and, especially, why it fails in particular contexts. Two 
factors that contribute to the perceived failure of law merit attention. First, the 
failure of particular instances of legal regulation are uncritically interpreted as a 
failure of law itself and of the legal enterprise in all its manifestations. Second, 
the complexity of achieving successful legal regulation has long been 
underestimated, in part because it is obscured by two dogmas of modernity: the 
view that the state is the central (if not exclusive) expression of the social contract, 
and the commitment to instrumental rationality as the paramount way of achieving 
social change through law. Law’s failure is thus at least in part grounded in what 
law is (mis)understood to be.
If the impact of these two factors on our assessment of the regulatory failure 
of law is to be understand, a new way of conceiving the social reality of law — a 
new paradigm for sodo-legal research, and a new paradigm for standard doctrinal 
legal analysis — is needed. The “Law in Society” initiative of the Canadian 
Institute for Advanced Research has adopted such a paradigm: critical legal 
pluralism. This approach has three root premises:
(1) there is a multiplicity of legal orders in every society,
(2) the legal order of the state is not necessarily central or dominant, nor is
it ever independent of these other kinds of legal order,
(3) not every legal order necessarily reproduces the characteristics ascribed to
state law.
Of course, the basic ideas of critical legal pluralism are not new. Historically, 
prior to the invention of the nation state and its presumed unitary legal order, 
legal pluralism was the dominant mode of legal analysis. But in the 20th century, 
legal pluralism has tended to be more the resort of sociologists and 
anthropologists than legal scholars. Until recently, scholars in the pluralist 
tradition tended to focus on exotic or pathological examples of the phenomenon.2 
This 20th century legal pluralism has also been preoccupied with showing the
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limits of state law in terms of its efficiency and legitimacy.3 The laws of society 
(seen to be informal, pluralistic and decentralised) were thus opposed to the laws 
of political states (seen to be formal, unitary and centrally governed by the Rule 
of Law).
In the general context of modernity and the liberal legal project, the 
intellectual positions taken by legal pluralists, and especially by those concerned 
with its non-exotic and non-pathological instances, have frequently been considered 
to be regressive. They could not be reconciled with the dominant wisdom 
espousing values of democratic republicanism, societal reform through law and 
professional expertise — all legacies of a fidelity to Weberian postulates of legal- 
rational authority. Over the past decade, however, there has been a revival of 
interest in legal pluralism, to the point where it is now viewed as the most effective 
vehicle for interdisciplinary research in law, be this among anthropologists, 
sociologists, political scientists, geographers, historians and economists. Drawing 
on many of the insights of postmodernism, sodo-legal scholars working in this field 
are now attempting to explore law as a discourse relating to power and knowledge 
systems, notably the professional knowledge system of state law, which is 
appropriated, refined and perfected by lawyers and courts.
Of course, in the context of legal pluralism it is easy to lose sight of official 
law or state law as the paradigmatic form of publicly acknowledged law in 
Canadian society, and, in so doing, it is easy to lose sight of the problem of power. 
After all, in modern states the legal order is the focus of fundamental concerns 
over legitimacy, access, transparency and enfranchisement. Issues of power cannot 
be addressed adequately if scholarly research is limited to the identification of 
competing official and unofficial legal regimes. Moreover, if the notion of law 
were totally detached from the state and demoted to the generic status of a mere 
normative system, it would be necessary to invent a new name for it, in order to 
comprehend the interaction between diverse normative systems — that is, 
internormativity. Just as the expression Law and Society research misstates the 
relationship among these various normative orders as one which opposes all of 
them to the official system, so too, to collapse the distinctive features of state 
normativity destroys criteria for assessing the interplay of power.
In the past, legal pluralists have tended to advance structuralist solutions — 
such as the concept of social control — as a means for distinguishing law from 
politics and economics. But none of these structuralist strategies helps to identify 
exactly what it is that is explicitly “legal” about this form of normative ordering. 
Critical legal pluralists argue that the best way to understand law is to begin with 
the generally agreed-upon central elements of state law -  rules, concepts,
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methodologies, procedures, institutions — a value structure. From these central 
elements, one must then reconstruct a sociological self-description of legal 
regimes. This self-description captures the movement from structure to process, 
from norm to action, and from jurisdiction to legitimation in socio-legal research. 
The discourse of justification within these different legal orders can then be used 
as the criterion for isolating the individuality which meaningfully separates one 
from the other, and which permits the official legal order to display its 
distinctiveness.
* *  *
Socio-legal research no longer requires any introduction to Canadian scholars, nor 
need it now feel obliged constantly to defend its premises and objectives. But 
recognition and legitimation are just preliminary steps to its flourishing. The 
development and refinement of an intellectual framework within which such 
research may be productively pursued are the next tasks on the socio-legal 
scholarly agenda: in this endeavour the interaction and reiteration of critical legal 
pluralism promise to be central.
